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WHY STUDY HISTORY? 
ON ITS EPISTEMIC BENEFITS AND  
ITS RELATION TO THE SCIENCES 
 
Abstract: I try to return the focus of the philosophy of history to the nature of 
understanding, with a particular emphasis on Louis Mink’s project of 
exploring how historical understanding compares to the understanding we find 
in the natural sciences.  On the whole, I come to a conclusion that Mink 
almost certainly would not have liked: that the understanding offered by 
history has a very similar epistemic profile to the understanding offered by the 
sciences, a similarity that stems from the fact that both are concerned with 
grasping how the objects of their study are structured, or how the various 
elements of the things they study depend upon and relate to one another.  At 
the same time, however, I claim that historical inquiry naturally puts us in a 
position to acquire further epistemic goods, including the old-fashioned 
epistemic good of wisdom, which is plausibly constituted by knowledge of how 
to live well.  This is something the natural sciences cannot offer, and it is part 
of the reason why history is such an important form of inquiry. 
 
*** 
 
In an incisive essay published fifty years ago, Louis Mink (1966) argued that in 
order to appreciate what is distinctive about history as a discipline, we first 
need to clarify what is distinctive about the epistemology of history.  In 
particular, he suggested, we first need to clarify how the sort of understanding 
offered by history differs from the understanding offered by the natural 
sciences.  Only thus, Mink claimed, can we properly establish not just history’s 
autonomy as a form of inquiry, but also its special importance. 
 
Mink’s call to focus on the nature of historical understanding had a respectable 
lineage; it goes back at least as far as the great German philosophers Wilhelm 
Dilthey and Johann Gustav Droysen.1  But, for the most part, the call was 
little heeded because of the tremendous impact of Carl Hempel’s work in the 
philosophy of history, which focused not on the nature of historical 
                                                   
1 For more on the history of this view, see Bevir (2007) and Feest (2010). 
 2 
understanding but rather on the nature of historical explanation.2  Hempel’s 
papers therefore led to several decades of argument about whether the 
“explanatory logic” of historians mimicked the natural sciences, or whether it 
had a logic of its own.3  
 
As Jaegwon Kim (2010) has recently argued, however, what was typically left 
out of this focus on various models of explanation was precisely their epistemic 
relevance—that is, how these different models were supposed to provide 
understanding in the mind that took them up, and how they were supposed to 
inform the distinctive modes of thinking that characterized either history or 
the natural sciences.4  As Kim suggests, the focus on explanation rather than 
understanding therefore seemed to get things back to front: since we 
presumably desire explanations because of the understanding they provide, 
understanding should in some way be normative for explanations.  In the 
decades following Hempel’s contributions, however, it was explanation calling 
the shots, with understanding playing a minor role.  
 
In this essay, I will try to return the focus in the philosophy of history to the 
nature of understanding, with a particular emphasis on Mink’s project of 
exploring how historical understanding compares to the understanding we find 
in the natural sciences.5  On the whole, however, I will come to a conclusion 
that Mink almost certainly would not have liked: that the understanding 
offered by history has a very similar epistemic profile to the understanding 
offered by the sciences.  The particular things understood differ, of course, 
because history is primarily concerned with human beings and their actions, 
while the natural sciences are not so restricted.  But, I will argue, this 
difference in content does not amount to a “deep difference” because the 
                                                   
2 See especially Hempel (1942; 1963).  
3 For an overview, see Macdonald and Macdonald (2009). 
4 Kim writes: “The actual theories of explanation that we have accumulated to date, such as 
Hempel’s covering-law theory, the causal theories of Salmon, Lewis, and Humphreys, the 
pragmatic theories of Bromberger, Achinstein, and van Fraassen—don’t look much like theories of 
understanding or accounts of a type of knowledge.  Although explanatory understanding is 
sometimes mentioned… it seems quickly to be lost sight of when serious theory construction 
begins, and terms like ‘understanding,’ ‘intelligibility,’ and ‘explanatory knowledge’ seldom make 
an appearance once the initial stage-setting is over” (Kim 2010: 168). 
5 A subtle issue here is that there were other thinkers around Mink’s time, such as William Dray 
(1957; 1963; 1964, ch. 2), who advocated a verstehen approach to the human sciences, i.e., one 
that focused on the idea of “empathetic understanding” as a distinctive method of the human 
sciences.  This is in keeping with the earlier methodenstreit (debate over method) involving 
Dilthey, Weber, and others.  Mink, however, was careful to distinguish the idea of empathetic 
understanding as a method from the idea of understanding as an epistemic goal of inquiry (Mink 
1966: 38). Getting clearer about the goal might well have consequences for methodology, but 
Mink thought it more important to focus on the goal first—a point about which I believe he was 
exactly right. 
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powers of the mind that are engaged in understanding in the two areas are 
strikingly similar, and the general things that are understood—what I will call 
“structures”—are fundamentally the same.  In terms of the intrinsic epistemic 
benefits they offer, or in terms of the epistemic profile of the understanding 
produced, it is hard to find deep differences.  
 
At the same time, and perhaps more pleasingly to Mink, I will argue that 
historical inquiry naturally puts us in a position to acquire further epistemic 
goods, albeit goods that I claim are extrinsic to the study of history.  In 
particular, I will claim that history enables us both (i) rationally to assess the 
legitimacy of our current practices and institutions, as well as (ii) to expand our 
sense of what it might mean to live well as a human being.  History therefore 
provides the raw materials for the old-fashioned (indeed, perhaps 
unfashionable) epistemic good of wisdom, which is plausibly constituted by 
knowledge of how to live well.6  This the natural sciences cannot offer, even in 
raw form, and it is part of the reason why history is such an important form of 
inquiry. 
 
1. A General Framework for Understanding 
 
Let us first try to clarify the sort of understanding that the natural sciences 
offer.  This will allow us both to see where historical understanding conforms 
to this pattern, as well as where it might seem to chart a new course. 
 
To begin with, it is worth noting that for some it is a mistake to even try to 
clarify the sort of understanding the natural sciences offer because, properly 
understood, they do not offer any understanding at all.  This is due to the fact, 
it is said, that you can only understand something if it has an “inner life” to be 
understood, and since things in the natural world like atoms and stars lack an 
inner life, we can only try to explain or predict how they will behave, rather 
than understand them.  As Isaiah Berlin succinctly put the idea, which he 
attributed to thinkers such as Vico, Dilthey, and Droysen: “We observe, we 
learn facts about, but we cannot understand, stones or the death-watch beetle” 
(Berlin 1976: 28). 
 
It seems fair to say that this radical view is clearly too radical: natural scientists 
certainly seem driven by a desire to understand the world, and they certainly 
seem to acquire a deep and profound understanding of it.  Still, I believe 
Berlin’s encapsulation of this idea is instructive, because it indicates a helpful 
way forward.  
 
                                                   
6 For a defense, see my (2015; forthcoming). 
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To see this, grant for a moment that it sounds odd to say that you can 
understand something like a stone.7  Still, it hardly sounds odd to say that you 
can understand countless other things in the natural world, such as volcanoes, 
or cells, or Brownian motion.  But we can then ask: what is it that makes these 
later things apt for understanding?  Why does it seem odd to say that you can 
understand something like a stone, but perfectly reasonable to suppose that 
you can understand things like volcanoes, or cells, or Brownian motion?   
 
The reason, I suggest, is that while all of these latter things have structure, 
stones intuitively do not—that is to say, stones do not have elements that 
depend upon and relate to one another in the way that volcanoes and cells do.8  
They instead seem more like arbitrarily attached parts than like a working 
whole.9   It therefore seems that we have apt candidates for understanding—
things to be understood—when we have structures with various elements that 
depend upon and relate to one another.  
 
This idea accords with Philip Kitcher’s claim that a central aim of science is to 
grasp the structure of the world (Kitcher 1989); it is also in keeping with the 
oft-repeated claim of scientists that their main goal is to figure out how the 
objects of their study “work,” whether those objects be volcanoes or cells or 
Brownian motion (or cancer, or black holes, or photosynthesis, and on and 
on).  In these cases, I suggest, figuring out how something works is equivalent 
to figuring out how the various elements of the thing depend upon, and relate 
to one another.  This is reflected in the fact that one of the main goals of 
experimental design in the sciences is to isolate variables and control for 
outside influences—presumably so scientists can better appreciate how changes 
in certain variables (i.e., elements of the structure or system) will lead, or fail to 
lead, to changes in others.  In a slogan, the idea is therefore that science reveals 
structure by showing how the various elements of the world depend upon and 
relate to one another. 
 
Taken in this way, all of the sciences are plausibly concerned with revealing 
such structures—not just disciplines such as physics, chemistry, and biology, 
where talk of structure is commonplace, but also fields such as evolutionary 
biology where appeals to structure might not be as obvious.  (Thus, as Lewens 
(2015: 255-56) points out, an evolutionary biologist will help us to understand 
                                                   
7 Leaving the poor death-watch beetle out of things for the moment, although I believe this case is 
worth thinking carefully about in its own right. 
8 For other contemporary philosophers who tie understanding to structure, see Zagzebski (2001), 
Grimm (2011, 2017), and Greco (2014).  According to Julius Moravcsik (1979), this was also the 
view of the ancient Greeks, especially Plato. 
9 Alternatively, if you were to push back and claim that there is such structure in a stone, as some 
audiences have done, then I submit it would then become a good candidate for understanding. 
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how the length of sperm whale’s enormous nose depended on these factors 
rather than those, etc.)    
 
What is more, in appealing to the idea of structure—structure that tracks 
dependency—we do not have to say that a concern for laws of the sort that 
Hempel emphasized is banished from this picture of the sciences.  Far from it.  
Instead, these dependencies can often be expressed in law-like form—even if 
they do not hold universally, or in an exceptionless way.  Thus a simple law 
like Newton’s second law, f=ma, can be taken to express the way in which 
these different properties or variables (force, mass, and acceleration) depend 
upon one another, in the sense that the formula shows us, in compact form, 
how changing the value of a variable such as mass will lead, ceteris paribus—to 
a change in the force.  It also suggests, by what it leaves out, that changing the 
value of certain other variables—say, the color of an object—will fail to lead to 
changes in the force variable. 
 
For our purposes here, a special advantage of this approach is that it seems like 
historians too would be willing to sign on to the idea that they are interested in 
identifying structures or relations of dependence within the various societies or 
periods they study.  Further, when I speak of structures or relations of 
dependence, this is meant to be broad enough to encompass the way in which 
an individual or group’s actions can be said to depend on reasons.  Thus a 
historian might explain Alexander’s decision to invade India in 326 BC in 
terms of his desire “to reach the ends of the world and the Great Outer Sea,” 
along with his belief that the invasion would accomplish this.  Here we can 
come to understand his action by identifying the beliefs and desires (surely 
more complex than just described) that underwrote his decision, or on which 
his decision depended.10   
 
So far then we seem to have a natural parallel between the natural sciences and 
history.  In both types of inquiry, understanding a thing—whether a physical 
or biological system, or an ancient system of trade, or a person’s actions—turns 
on grasping its structure, that is, how its various elements depend upon and 
relate to one another.  
 
                                                   
10 A further advantage of adopting the language of dependence is that it allows us to sidestep 
controversial talk of someone’s reasons causing his or her actions—which might make it seem like 
the reasons coerce or determine the actions, and hence drive out free will.  Regardless of how one 
thinks reasons are related to actions—whether it is by coercion or not—there can be little doubt 
that the actions depend upon the beliefs and desires, and that the historian gains in understanding 
to the extent that he or she can identify an agent’s genuine reasons (i.e., motivating beliefs and 
desires) as distinct from the spurious ones. For more detail on Alexander’s thinking in this 
example, see (Freeman 2011: ch. 3).   
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2. Deep Differences 
 
Suppose we grant that uncovering structure and thus revealing dependencies is 
a common pursuit of the historian and the scientist.  In a moment I will turn 
to consider whether there is anything deeply different about the kind of 
structures they examine, or perhaps about the way they are grasped or 
entertained, that would indicate a deep difference between historical and 
scientific understanding.  First, however, we need to say more about what a 
“deep difference” might amount to in this area.   
 
For comparison let us focus not on the epistemic good of understanding, but 
rather on the epistemic good of knowledge.  Even though we can suppose that 
something—a belief, say—will only count as an instance of knowledge in 
virtue of reliably getting the world right,11 within the genus or “big tent” of 
items that count as knowledge we can nonetheless point to a variety of deep 
differences.  Thus a priori knowledge will be deeply different in kind from 
perceptual knowledge, for instance, and memorial knowledge and introspective 
knowledge quite different besides.   
 
Further, a plausible reason why these various types or species of knowledge are 
so diverse is because their objects are so diverse.12  Thus roughly speaking a 
priori knowledge is concerned with necessary truths, while perceptual 
knowledge is concerned with the world around us, introspective truths with 
the contents of our consciousness, and memorial knowledge with our past 
experience.  The marked differences in these objects thus bring very different 
powers of the mind into play, or perhaps better different modes of thinking 
that are appropriate to these objects.  By comparison, it seems clear that are no 
deep differences between items of knowledge such as “perceptual knowledge of 
plates” as against “perceptual knowledge of cups,” or between “memorial 
knowledge of what happened last Wednesday” as against “memorial 
knowledge of what happened last Thursday.”  These do not amount to deep 
differences in types of knowledge, it seems, mainly because their objects are so 
similar. 
 
Returning to the nature of understanding, our question then is this: Are the 
particular structures grasped by historians and scientists so distinct that they 
mark deep differences in kinds of understanding? 
 
                                                   
11 I state this only as a plausible necessary condition, leaving Gettier examples aside. 
12 This accords too from the Platonic dictum that differences in forms of knowledge are taken 
from differences in their object. 
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In the remainder of the paper I will focus on two reasons for thinking there are 
such deep differences in structure.  First, because scientific understanding 
inherently appeals to more general or abstract structures (or relations of 
dependence), while historical understanding inherently appeals to more 
particularized, narrative, and diachronic structures; second, because historical 
understanding appeals to “holistic” structures in a way scientific understanding 
does not.  
 
3. Science and Generalized Structure 
 
To see what I have in mind by the generalizing nature of scientific 
understanding, consider the following two examples.   
 
First, suppose that as you walk into the kitchen you find your spouse chopping 
onions, and you notice her eyes begin to water.  Based on your experience with 
the ways of the kitchen and the chopping of onions, you will now more or less 
automatically attribute the watering to the chopping.  Although other things 
were going on at the time—the dog just entered the room, a car honked 
outside, motes of dust were landing on her arm, and so on—you will 
instinctively rule these out as the sources of the watering.  You correctly 
understand why her eyes are watering via grasping that the watering depends 
upon the chopping of the onions, not these other things.13 
 
And yet, while I take it you now understand—in some way, or to some 
degree—why your spouse’s eyes are watering, from a scientific point of view 
you arguably do not “really” understand why her eyes are watering unless you 
can provide a more substantial account.  In particular, from the point of view 
of scientific understanding, “really” understanding the watering will plausibly 
require knowing what it is about the chopping of the onions, and the way the 
chopping interacts with the constitution of the human eye, that leads to the 
watering.14  On this account, everyday things like “onions” and perhaps even 
“eyeballs” plausibly fall away as understanding grows.  What becomes 
important is identifying the general or underlying properties that onions and 
eyes possess, and relating them to one another in generalized terms. 
 
                                                   
13 Elsewhere I have argued, in Grimm (2017), that we can model these ideas on the notion of a 
“dependence map,” of the sort described by Alison Gopnik in, for instance, Gopnik et. al (2004) 
and Gopnik (2012). Other philosophers who importantly appeal to dependence in their accounts 
of understanding include Strevens (2011) and Greco (2014). 
14 It will require knowing, for example, that in chopping the onions a gas called Propanethiol S-
oxide is released, and that when this gas reaches the eye it reacts with the water to form a diluted 
solution of sulphric acid, which irritates the nerve endings of the eye, causing them to water. 
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Or again, suppose you are in your living room and you see your TV spring to 
life.  You also notice your daughter on the sofa with her thumb on the power 
button of the TV remote, so you naturally and instinctively attribute the 
turning on of the TV to pressing of the button.  Under normal circumstances, 
we will therefore be perfectly happy to say that you now understand why the 
TV sprang to life; given your past experience, you know it wasn’t the breeze 
that just came through the window, or the new song that came on the radio.  
You know it was the pressing of the button on the remote.   
 
Here again, however, even though you will have a certain degree of 
understanding in light of having identified the dependence between the TV 
and the remote, I take it that if you really wanted to scientifically understand 
why the set turned on you would leave behind talk of remotes and TVs 
altogether and instead think in terms of things like light-emitting diodes, 
infrared pulses, and photo cell receptors. 
 
One tempting moral to draw from these cases is therefore that in the sciences 
increases in understanding inherently lead towards generality.  They lead the 
inquirer, that is, to think of particular cases of dependence as token instances 
of a larger type.  It is, moreover, when we move to the level of the type, or the 
more general category—leaving behind individual onions for sulfuric acids, or 
TV remote controls for infrared pulses—that we “really” understand how the 
world is structured, and how its various elements depend upon one another.  
 
4. Historical Structure: Generalizations and Narratives  
 
Suppose for the moment that this move towards generalization is true across 
the board with respect to scientific understanding.15  Can the same be said of 
historical understanding?  Or do we here have the makings of a deep 
difference?  In this section I will suggest that the answer to this question is: 
Yes and No.  It depends on the sort of history on offer.  But to see this will 
require first saying a little more about the nature of history, and marking a few 
important distinctions in the literature. 
 
For simplicity, suppose in doing history we start by trying to establish “what 
happened”—what some philosophers of history have dubbed a mere 
chronicle.16  While establishing such a chronicle or record of events may well 
be the fruit of ingenious, creative, and painstaking research, it would not be 
yet, I take it, the sort of historical research that yields an understanding of why 
things happened.  Instead it would be more akin to a layperson, in one of our 
                                                   
15 I will, however, raise doubts about this claim in the following section. 
16 For more on the distinction between histories and chronicles, see e.g., Danto (1968: ch. 7). 
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previous examples, establishing a record of events along the lines of: a new 
song came on the radio, the girl pressed the remote, a breeze came through the 
window, the TV sprang to life, and so on. 
 
So what then would it take to bring this chronicle to life, or to make it the sort 
of historical account that yields an understanding of why these events 
happened?  According to Morton White’s influential analysis from the 1960s, 
it would require identifying the explanatory connections that hold between 
these various events, and laying them out in a way that yields a historical 
narrative, and not simply a chronicle.  To appeal to White’s example: 
 
The chronicler is likely to tell us: ‘The King of England died, and then 
the Queen of England died, and then the Prince of England died, and 
then the Princess of England died.  And there endeth our chronicle.’ 
(White 1963: 6) 
 
But, White claims, things are quite different with “a corresponding history,” 
which “is likely to read”: 
 
‘The King of England died, so the Queen of England died of grief.  
And because he worried so much about the Queen’s death, the Prince 
of England committed suicide; and therefore the Princess of England 
died later of loneliness.  And so endeth our lugubrious history.’ (White 
1963: 6) 
 
As this suggests, on White’s analysis we gain understanding of the various 
events in the chain through grasping the explanatory connections that link 
them, especially connections that can be marked by words such as “because” or 
“therefore.”  
 
For simplicity, we might graph White’s case in a “dependence map” as 
follows: 
 
King’s death à Queen’s death from grief à Prince’s suicide from worry à 
Princess’s death from loneliness 
 
Now it seems clear that in grasping any particular pairwise relation of 
dependence here—say, the Princess’s death from loneliness, because of her 
brother’s absence—one would thereby acquire some legitimate understanding 
of the resulting event.  What would it take, however, to grow in understanding 
of the Princess’s death, or to come to “really” or “fully” understand it?  
Mimicking the earlier logic of scientific understanding, it might seem that the 
apt thing to do is to try to generalize as much as possible, first by seeing the 
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Princess and the Prince as tokens of particular types, and second by trying to 
establish more general regularities or dependencies that hold among those 
types.  Along the latter lines, perhaps one might say that people with tight kin 
connections of this type, when confronted with circumstances of this type, tend 
to react in these sorts of ways.   
 
It seems clear enough that historians sometimes look for (and, in my view, 
sometimes find) precisely these high-level patterns, and might indeed grow in 
understanding thereby.17  In light of the appeal to narrative, however, 
especially the diachronic or spread-over-time nature of most stories, we can 
now see another way of thinking about how growth in understanding might 
occur, and one that is prima facie distinctive of the human sciences.  In 
particular, the appeal to narrative invites the idea that one’s understanding of 
some particular event in the chain—say, the culminating event of the 
Princess’s death—might deepen or improve the further back one goes in the 
chain.  Thus someone who knows that the Princess died because she terribly 
missed the Prince surely has some authentic understanding of why she died—
such a person does not, after all, mistakenly attribute the death to poisoning or 
the like—but is also seems that the person’s understanding of why the Princess 
died would grow or increase the more she learned about the story.  That is to say, 
someone who knows the whole tale from the beginning, the whole chain of 
dependencies, would seem to better understand why she died than somehow 
who grasped only the last pair in the chain. 
 
And here there might be thought to be nothing parallel going on in the 
sciences.  After all, your understanding of why the TV sprang to life—taken as 
a physical event—does not seem to increase the further you go into the past.  
Instead, you seem to have everything you need right now for understanding 
this if you can appeal to the sorts of generalized dependencies I noted earlier, 
concerning light waves, photo receptors, and so on.  Someone who 
understands all this, it seems, can exhaustively or entirely understand why it 
sprang to life—no history needed. 
 
5. Narratives and Scientific Understanding 
 
                                                   
17 Think for instance of Jared Diamond’s Pulitzer-Prize-Winning book Guns, Germs, and Steel 
(1999), where he argues the real drivers of historical events are not particular agents and their 
decisions but rather large-scale forces relating to disease rates, improvements in technology 
(especially weaponry), and diet (especially access to protein rich foods). And of course there are the 
grand theories of philosophers such as Hegel and Marx—where the real variables moving history, 
the things that determine why one alternative transpires rather than another, are much deeper 
than the naked eye suggest, and thus where “real understanding” is genuinely located. 
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Does this then offer us a deep difference we were looking for between kinds of 
structure?  On the one hand, that the structures of interest to science are 
inherently general and abstract; on the other, that the structures of interest to 
historians are inherently specific, particularized, and diachronically-embedded?   
 
We have already considered, albeit briefly, one reason to doubt such an easy 
distinction: that  there seem to be perfectly viable projects in history that look 
for general trends and dependencies.  At the same time, another reason to 
doubt such an easy distinction—and arguably a more interesting one, because 
easier to overlook—comes from the fact that many sciences themselves find 
understanding in particularized, diachronically-embedded structures.  In other 
words, there are many sciences—especially those that have a “backward-
looking” element, such as geology, or evolutionary biology, or cosmology—
where a deeper knowledge of the narrative chain leading up to current 
circumstances is importantly tied to growth in understanding.18    
 
We gestured at this with respect to the case of the sperm whale’s nose earlier, 
but for an additional example consider a geological narrative of how the 
Himalayas were formed. 
 
It seems fair to say that someone who can point to the high-velocity crash of 
India into the Asian subcontinent, some eighty million years ago, as the 
proximate cause of the Himalayas and their staggering height has some genuine 
understanding of these things, but that someone who grasps the whole causal 
series leading to the crash plausibly has a still better understanding of the 
Himalayas and their height.  Thus someone who correctly knows that India 
broke off from a section of Africa near Madagascar, for instance, seems to have 
a better understanding of the Himalayas than someone who was ignorant 
about this, or someone who mistakenly believed India broke off from (say) 
Antarctica on its way towards Asia.  And the same seems to hold for many 
other types of scientific inquiry that have a “backward-looking” dimension: 
thus our understanding of global warming, or of our current evolutionary 
niche, seems to improve when we can trace these phenomena back through 
history, via a narrative that brings out how the present depends on the past. 
 
So far, then, we seem to have the following results: There are some sciences 
where growth in understanding seems to occur when we turn to 
generalizations and abstractions.  But arguably too there are strains of 
                                                   
18 For more on this point, see Cleland (2009) and Stueber (2012). In geology, for instance, the 
slogan that “the past is the key to the present”—usually attributed to one of the founders of the 
discipline, the 19th Century Scottish scientist Charles Lyell—seems to be as central to the 
geologist’s self-understanding as Socrates’s dictum that “the unexamined life is not worth living” is 
to philosophers. See, for instance, Blundell and Scott (1998). 
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historical work where growth in understanding occurs in the same way.  At the 
same time, just as our understanding of certain historical events seems to grow 
by looking further into the narrative past, at earlier chains of explanatory 
connections, so too there seem to be certain sciences—such as geology, 
evolutionary biology, and cosmology—wherein our understanding increases as 
we learn more about the past, and especially about earlier chains of explanatory 
connections.   
 
In short, we have yet to find a deep difference between the kinds of structure 
studied in history and the natural sciences, at least not one that holds across 
the board. 
 
6. Understanding and the Space of Possibility 
 
In this section I will consider one final suggestion, inspired by Mink himself.19  
The idea here is that historical understanding is in some sense “holistic” in way 
that scientific understanding is not, a fact reflected in the way that scientific 
findings are “detachable” in a way that historical findings are not.  Thus 
according to Mink the historian typically arrives at his or her understanding of 
an era by developing a rich sense of the context of that era, and keeping this 
context in mind is in some way intrinsic to the understanding itself.  This is 
why, Mink argues, you need to read a historian’s whole books, and not merely 
the abstracts of those books, in order to understand what he or she 
understands.  By comparison, he claims, scientists can often summarize their 
results in short conclusions, which can then be communicated easily to other 
scientists.  Historical understanding therefore apparently requires coming to 
grips with “wholes”—whole contexts, or expansive structures of some kind—in 
a way that scientific understanding does not. 
 
This is, I believe, an important insight but also a subtle one, so to better grasp 
the idea it will help to turn to another example, one with a bit more historical 
grounding than Morton’s lugubrious narrative.  With its 500th anniversary 
approaching, it is perhaps particularly apt to focus on the circumstances 
surrounding the Reformation in Germany, which we might as a first start 
portray like this: 
 
Catholic Church’s growing worldliness à Luther’s dissatisfaction à 
Luther’s dissent à Church’s attempts at suppression à 30 years war…  
 
Clearly, this is all quite crude.  But suppose for the sake of argument that the 
relations of dependence here are at least genuine.  We can now again ask: 
                                                   
19 See especially Mink (1966: 38-41). 
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What would it take to grow in historical understanding of this series, or of a 
particular pairing in the series?  And does this direction of this growth lead us 
to a new and distinctive kind of structure to be grasped? 
 
Consider, for instance, the Church’s attempts at suppression.  On the one 
hand, and to return to an earlier suggestion, it might be thought that a move 
towards generality will lead to an increase in understanding on this score.  
Rather than think of the Catholic Church in particular, we could think instead 
in terms of a type such as “a powerful religious institution” or perhaps just “a 
powerful institution”; and rather than think of Luther in particular, we could 
think instead of just “a dissenting member of that institution” or the like.  We 
might then be able to arrive at a generalization such as that powerful 
institutions will attempt to suppress dissent, when feasible.  Alternatively, it 
might be thought that understanding grows the more one learns about the 
earlier links in the narrative.  I will understand more about the Church’s 
attempts at suppression as I learn more about, e.g., the reasons why the 
Church was becoming more worldly in the 14th and 15th centuries.  
 
I do not want to dispute these moves as ways of gaining understanding, and we 
have already said something about them earlier.  Building on Mink’s insight 
about holism, however, what I now want to suggest is that historical 
understanding can grow in still another way, and one that might be thought to 
mark out a deep difference with scientific understanding.  This is in a holistic 
way that emphasizes the sort of “modal context” that surrounds a particular 
event or decision.20  That is, one that emphasizes the alternatives or 
possibilities that were (in some sense) “open” at the time, but which were not 
actualized.  Historical research is not just epistemically distinctive but also 
particularly valuable, on this suggestion, because it brings to life or unearths 
these different possibilities, and because it helps us to appreciate why certain 
alternatives were realized rather than others.   
 
Consider, for instance, the Church’s attempts to suppress the dissent 
surrounding Luther, sometimes with the aid of force.  While one might think 
this is explicable, predictable, intelligible, and so on just in virtue of the sort of 
general principle a Hempelian might espouse—that powerful institutions (or 
perhaps powerful religious institutions in particular) naturally move to suppress 
dissent—a historian will likely be dissatisfied with this sort of account precisely 
because she will be aware of many occasions on which powerful institutions 
did not suppress dissent, and she will want to know what it is that 
distinguishes this occasion from others.  With respect to the medieval Church 
                                                   
20 For more on the importance of modality for understanding, see Nozick (1981: 8-13), Hawthorn 
(1991), Lipton (2009: 49-52), and le Bihan (2017). 
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in particular, she will also plausibly be aware that dissent was endemic in the 
medieval Church, often to the point of heresy; and yet for all that, the dissent 
was typically tolerated rather than suppressed (see, e.g., Elton 1990: ch. 1).  So 
what was it, she will naturally be driven to ask, that made it seem more 
important to move against the dissent in Luther’s circumstances, rather than 
tolerate it?  To really understand the Church’s attempt at suppression, she will 
need to know more. 
 
Plausibly, understanding grows in these cases when one can identify additional 
elements of Luther’s dissent that were what we might call distinguishers or 
difference makers—that is, elements that helped to bring about one of these 
alternatives rather than others, and thus enrich our sense of the context.21  In 
Luther’s case, historians have pointed to the recent advent of the printing 
press, which made it easier for people to learn about his dissent, and hence 
made that dissent more embarrassing for the Church; or again, they have 
pointed to Luther’s powerful political patrons who were eager to assert their 
authority against Rome, and hence helped make him more than an isolated 
dissenter in the hinterlands; and so on.22 
 
Deeper or richer historical understanding in this sense would therefore be 
holistic because it would encompass not just some final pairwise statement of 
dependence, but the range of possibilities that in some sense “framed” this 
final statement.23  This is why we need to read the historian’s books, and not 
just brief abstracts of her “findings”—because we need to appreciate the fuller 
modal context within which particular dependencies were identified, in order 
to properly describe her settled state of understanding.  As we might put it, 
being “alive” to these different possibilities is part of her ultimate epistemic 
accomplishment, and not a mere step in the journey.  For notice that if you 
think that “Luther’s dissent” is a fine but ultimately inadequate explanation, 
and you think that “Luther’s dissent combined with developments in printing, 
strong political support,” and so on is a much better explanation, then this is 
                                                   
21 This is a point emphasized by the historian Leonard Krieger in his discussion of Dray: 
“[William Dray] grasps, in the first place, an essential feature of what satisfies the historian in way 
of explanation—that when a historian seeks to explain a particular action what he wants explained 
is precisely the particularity of the action: why it was produced by this man at this place in time.  If 
an historian understands that the relationship between his condition and his action as a case of a 
generic relationship between classes of such conditions and such actions, then he sees in this not 
an explanation but something to be explained—how this relationship differs from others in the 
class” (Krieger 1963: 137). 
22 For excellent accounts, see Elton (1990) and MacCullough (2005). 
23 Arguably, this approach is therefore similar to W.H. Walsh’s view that historians provide 
understanding through a process of “colligation,” by which he means “the procedure of explaining 
an event by tracing its intrinsic relations to other events and locating it in its historical context” 
(Walsh 1967: 59).  I am hesitant to say how close the views are exactly, however, because I am 
unclear concerning how Walsh conceives of internal relations. 
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plausibly because you are implicitly bearing in mind (or cognitively reckoning 
with) the other occasions in which dissent was met with toleration.   
 
This therefore arguably offers us a new way of thinking about the structure that 
is understanding’s object in cases like this—one that extends into the 
“possibility space” surrounding the focal event we would like to understand, 
and thus cannot be easily charted in the sort of diachronic graphs we appealed 
to earlier.  But we can once again ask, now for a final time: Even if we are 
right in thinking that historical understanding is holistic in this way, does it 
thereby offer us a deep difference with scientific understanding?  For better or 
worse, I again have my doubts.   
 
To see why, consider a parallel example in the sciences.  Suppose a crop 
scientist is wondering why the corn in a certain British county is wilting.  
Through careful testing he concludes that it is not because of the local insects, 
or because of lack of water; it is because of a new fungus in the area.  It 
therefore seems that he now understands why the wilting is occurring, and this 
because he has identified a real relation of dependence between the wilting and 
fungus.   
 
But now suppose he learns from a scientist in a county further north that the 
fungus was introduced there, and yet the corn did not wilt.  He will then 
naturally be led to ask: why did the fungus produce wilting in the crops in my 
county rather than the northern one?  What is it that accounts for the 
difference?  Suppose after further investigation he finds a significant difference 
(on average) in the acidity in the soil between the two counties.  Plausibly, 
then, it is not just the fungus that makes a difference to the wilting, but the 
fungus combined with a certain sort of soil.  His understanding will therefore 
grow, it seems, as he develops this richer sense of the variables upon which the 
wilting depends. 
 
I hope the analogy with the Luther example is clear.  In both cases, it seems, 
two things are in play: first, understanding is both deeply tied to the inquirer’s 
sense of possibility; second, that the possibilities that the inquirer entertains in 
some sense “live on” in the understanding he or she eventually achieves.  They 
live on, because the inquirer’s sense of the possible informed his sense of what 
he needed to rule out, or take into account, in order to achieve understanding 
in the first place.  
 
I conclude that the holistic character of many instances of historical 
understanding are therefore not unique to history, because it can also be found 
in many cases of scientific understanding.  Perhaps not in all cases of scientific 
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understanding, but in enough that we do not seem to have a deep difference, 
across the board, between these areas of inquiry.  
 
7. The Extrinsic Epistemic Benefits of History 
 
To this point my conclusions have been mostly negative: in particular, I have 
argued that there are no deep, intrinsic differences between historical 
understanding and scientific understanding that hold across the board.  In 
both history and the sciences, the objects of understanding are structures, and 
in both cases we understand when we figure out how these structures “work”—
that is, how the various elements in the structure depend upon and relate to 
one another.   
 
In some cases these are high-level, generalizing structures, and in some cases 
they are diachronic, particularizing structures—but this variation in structure is 
something that can be found both within the natural sciences and within 
history.  I have also claimed that in many cases our quest for understanding is 
closely tied to our sense of possibility, or of the sort of contrasts we are trying 
to rule out.24  The person who understands is therefore able to identify what it 
is that makes the difference among these possibilities.  But again, I believe this 
is an important point of commonality between the sciences and history, not a 
deep difference. 
 
In the remainder of the paper I will nonetheless argue that the special nature 
of history’s subject matter—namely, human beings—naturally gives rise to a 
range of extremely valuable and closely related extrinsic epistemic benefits, ones 
that extend beyond the intrinsic benefit of grasping how the objects of their 
study depend upon and relate to one another.25  
 
First, to clarify: when I speak of a “closely related extrinsic benefit,” I mean 
one that in some sense naturally follows from, but is not identical to, the 
intrinsic benefit.  The epistemic good of knowing how to ride a bicycle, for 
instance, naturally gives rise to the extrinsic benefit of riding a bicycle, and the 
epistemic good of knowing how to make coffee naturally gives rise to the 
extrinsic benefit of drinking coffee (one hopes, good coffee).  These are both 
cases of practical benefits naturally flowing from epistemic goods, but there are 
also cases of epistemic benefits flowing from epistemic goods.  Thus knowing 
how to read gives rise to the numerous epistemic benefits to be found in 
books, or knowing how to do Carbon-14 dating gives rise to rise to new 
                                                   
24 I have not argued, here, that this holds for all cases of understanding, though I believe that it 
does.  For an argument see Grimm (2008). 
25 For other ways in which the study of human beings seems to make a difference, see Grimm 
(2016). 
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information about the age of objects.  In all these cases, the extrinsic good 
follows naturally from the intrinsic good, but is not the same as it. 
 
With this in mind, I will now argue that the study of history gives rise to two 
extremely valuable epistemic benefits, albeit ones that are extrinsic in the same 
way.  First, it puts us in a position to evaluate the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 
many of our current practices and institutions.  Second, it provides us with a 
sense of “what is was like” to be part of past eras, and in this way expands our 
sense of the scope of human possibility. 
 
To illustrate the legitimacy point first, suppose what we’re trying to 
understand is not a natural thing like the Himalayas but rather a human 
institution or practice, such as the Electoral College of the United States.  On 
the one hand, this desire for understanding might simply take us in the 
direction of how the College “works”—how it is structured, and how these 
different elements of the structure relate to one another.  But as we have seen 
there another sort of question we might ask, along the “narrative” lines 
sketched earlier: namely, how did this particular institution, with this 
particular structure or arrangement, come to be?  And here what the historian 
will naturally try to unearth is not just a narrative history that appeals to brute 
causes, in a way that the geologist might with respect to the Himalayas, but 
rather a narrative that appeals to reasons and choices that were made during 
the past.26 
 
Suppose she successfully unearths these reasons, so we can appreciate how the 
present shape of the College depends upon them.  That is, I take it, an 
important epistemic, understanding-centered benefit that is intrinsic to her 
historical inquiry.  But it should also be clear that appreciating how a present 
arrangement depends upon these prior reasons and choices naturally puts us in 
a position to evaluate whether our present arrangement is based on good or 
compelling reasons, and hence worth keeping.  Perhaps more importantly, 
where history reveals not reasons at the root of our current arrangements, but 
rather darker forces such as power, or oppression, or privilege, this gives us a 
powerful lens through which we can assess our practices not just as rational or 
irrational, but as just or unjust, as oppressive or discriminatory, and so on.   
 
                                                   
26 In the case of the College, for instance, two reasons seemed to be particularly important.  First, 
putting the final vote in the hands of the College’s well-educated electors was supposed to be a 
guard against a tyrant winning the popular vote by duping or somehow or coercing the general 
public, which was thought to be more easily manipulable.  It was therefore a check against “the 
tyranny of the majority.”  Second, it was supposed to ensure that small states had a substantial say 
in the presidential election, and that their voices were not simply swamped by the stronger voices 
of larger states.  For a fuller account, see Best (1996). 
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In charting how current arrangements depend on the past in this way, the 
historian therefore gives us an invaluable tool through which to assess the 
present.27  That said, I nonetheless count this as an extrinsic benefit of 
historical understanding because to the extent that we take this genealogical 
information and turn to assess the reasons (motives, patterns of discrimination, 
etc.), we then take a step beyond historical evaluation and move to the realm 
of ethical evaluation.  Thus we might well conclude, on the basis of the 
historian’s narrative, that a current arrangement is unjust, because of its 
discriminatory roots.  What’s more, if we are right about this we will now 
enjoy an epistemic benefit (a newly formed, true moral assessment) that has 
naturally flowed from the narrative.  But in doing so, I suggest, the evaluator 
will be taking off her “historian’s hat” and putting on her “philosopher’s hat.”  
This is not a bad thing, needless to say, because the same epistemic agent can 
move artfully between the two kinds of assessment; but it does indicate the 
limits of what history can tell us about the world, and about the need to move 
to other kinds of evaluation.  
 
Second, I believe that in carefully laying out the modal context of past eras, the 
historian offers special insight into “what it was like” to have been part of that 
era.  Thus, for instance, it seems that to learn what it was like to be Alcibiades, 
or perhaps more generally like a 4th Century BC Athenian, is at least in part to 
acquire a sense of the “possibility space” that was spread out before the relevant 
actors—to acquire a sense of what their alternatives were like, and in particular 
which courses of action seemed closed and which seemed open.  To be clear, I 
do not want to say that this is all that knowing “what it was like” comes down 
to, but I do think it is an important part, and seems to be an intrinsic 
epistemic benefit of what the historian does when he or she details the context 
of a particular area.   
 
In acquiring this intrinsic benefit, however, I believe one also naturally acquires 
the extrinsic epistemic benefit of expanding our sense of how we might live as 
human beings.  One thereby learns, that is, different ways of being human, 
ways often radically different from one’s own—for instance, one learns about 
different goods that were taken to be important at various times, and about 
how these various goods were ranked or prioritized.  In this way, I believe, 
history also offers the opportunity to grow in wisdom, because it opens us to 
the possibility that our own ordering of goods might be misguided or in some 
                                                   
27 Note that there are often not simple “carry overs,” however.  An unjust source does not 
necessarily mean a currently unjust practice, and bad reasons for the practice at a time might not 
necessarily amount to bad reasons for the practice now. 
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way stunted.  It therefore offers us different, and perhaps in some ways 
superior, models for living well.28   
 
Naturally, the claim is not that appreciating these things about past cultures 
will make us wise.  That would be too much to ask.  The point is instead that 
appreciating the historical context in this way can offer the raw materials for 
wisdom.  If we use these raw materials well and we are fortunate, we will 
perhaps be a few steps further along the path towards wisdom than we were 
before.29 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
It is plausible that we all have a natural desire both to understand how the 
world works and to understand how to live well.  I have argued that history 
and the natural sciences are both oriented to the first goal—that is, to figuring 
out how their respective subject matters work, or how the various elements of 
what they study depend upon and relate to one another.  They thus share, in 
these basic respects, a common epistemic aim.  I have also claimed, however, 
that history sheds crucial light on the question of how we should live, by 
helping us to explore the legitimacy or illegitimacy of our current practices and 
institutions, and by broadening our sense of human possibility.  In this way 
history has a humanistic relevance that is simply foreign to the sciences, and 
that makes it particularly worthy of our study and attention.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
28 Of course, it might also help us to appreciate the merit of our own arrangement of goods, 
insofar as we come to think that a prior society was lacking in various ways. 
29 Naturally, I do not want to claim that history offers the only way of expanding our sense of the 
human.  Sociology, anthropology, and other disciplines besides (especially those that study great 
literature) also offer this benefit. 
30 Many thanks to Anna Alexandrova, Gabriel Byng, Paul Christesen, Christopher Cowie, 
Rachael Grimm, Matt Dougherty, David Ibbetson, Daniel Jütte, and Michael Strevens for helpful 
discussion concerning the issues surrounding this paper. 
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